Citation

Størkersen KV. Safety Sci. 2015; 75: 90-99.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2015, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.ssci.2015.01.012

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Safety regulation can decrease the frequent accidents in sea transportation, but aspects of the existing regulations are found to contribute negatively to safety. Earlier studies suggest other framework conditions to influence maritime safety more than regulation, without reviewing the relation between the maritime context and regulation. Therefore, this paper explores maritime regulators' safety-related decisions. The data consist of interviews with regulators and facts about other actors (i.e., politicians, shipping companies, interests groups, and the media) in the maritime transport arena. The findings, which are based on safety, decision-making, and arena theories, are not described by earlier research. Primarily, I find that a paralysis constrains safety regulation. Despite wanting a safe industry, transport competition leads the maritime actors to disagree about the priority of safety or profit, which paralyzes safety regulation development and constrains the regulators and their discretionary space (where they enforce the right safety regulations for the right sectors). Many of the decision criteria with which regulators must comply are forced upon them by others, so that regulators see them as constraints. Safety regulation is further weakened when market forces influence both regulation-making and enforcement. The findings demonstrate that industrial or political actors do not prioritize safety in practice; however, safety priority could lift maritime transport above the choice between safety and survival.