Citation

Lazear EP. Q. J. Econ. 2006; 121(3): 1029-1061.

Affiliation

Hoover Institution and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Copyright

(Copyright © 2006, Harvard University Department of Economics, Publisher MIT Press)

DOI

10.1162/qjec.121.3.1029

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Educators worry that high-stakes testing will induce teachers and their students to focus only on the test and ignore other, untested aspects of knowledge. Some counter that although this may be true, knowing something is better than knowing nothing and many students would benefit even by learning the material that is to be tested. Using the metaphor of deterring drivers from speeding, it is shown that the optimal rules for high-stakes testing depend on the costs of learning and of monitoring. Incentives need to be concentrated for those whose costs of action are high.