Citation

Trontin C, Bejean S. Safety Sci. 2004; 42(2): 121-141.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2004, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper exploits the results of agency theory with the aim of contributing a new viewpoint and a form for analysis of the current functioning of the occupational injury and disease section of the French Social Security system in its mission of providing incentives for prevention. After outlining the organization and specific features of insurance against occupational risks, an initial level of analysis highlights the presence of moral hazard in relations between insurer and company and between company and employee. A second level of analysis with the appeal to complex agency relationship models, multitask model and third-party model, is necessary to take into account the consequences for occupational injury prevention of wage indexing on productivity and the presence of supervisors between the legislator and the company.