Citation

Sanbonmatsu DM, Posavac SS, Stasney R. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 1997; 33(3): 276-295.

Affiliation

University of Utah

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1006/jesp.1996.1321

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Teigen (1974a, 1974b, 1983) observed that the numerical probabilities assigned to a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive events frequently exceed one. Three experiments were performed to examine why these inflated numerical probability judgments form and what they reflect about people's subjective beliefs. Some work suggests that numerical probability overestimations stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of the rules of probability calculation. Our findings, though, indicate that biased hypothesis testing processes operate that contribute to the subjective overestimation of the likelihood of a hypothetical event. People tend to perceive events to be more plausible than is possible because of confirmatory processes characterizing the selective testing of a hypothesis. Our findings indicate that these processes may lead to the unwarranteddisconfirmationof a focal hypothesis when the evidence for all of the alternatives is weak.