Citation

Zhukov YM. J. Peace Res. 2016; 53(2): 242-258.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2016, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0022343315626241

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

If a government is facing an armed uprising, why doesn't it confiscate all privately owned weapons? When and where is forcible disarmament most likely to occur? Can forcible disarmament reduce rebel activity? To establish a monopoly on the use of force, a government must either convince its citizens not to rebel, or remove their capacity to do so. Existing literature has left this choice - between punishment and disarmament - virtually unexplained. Most existing research focuses on disarmament in the context of post-conflict stabilization, rather than forcible disarmament during war. I introduce a mathematical model of irregular warfare, in which government and rebel forces seek a monopoly on violence. The model shows that disarmament occurs mainly in hard cases', where otherwise strong governments are unable to punish opponents or reward supporters. I test these claims with declassified archival data on counterinsurgency in the Soviet North Caucasus. The data confirm that disarmament was most likely where the government's coercive leverage was limited - due to poor intelligence and potential backlash from collateral damage. In these otherwise challenging circumstances, disarmament significantly reduced rebel violence - short-term and long-term, locally and region-wide. By limiting the potential coercive resources under the opposition's control, disarmament can render rebels unable to sustain a campaign of violence against the state.

Language: en