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Journal Article

Citation

Zhu Z, Chen B, Reniers G, Zhang L, Qiu S, Qiu X. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2017; 14(10): e14101155.

Affiliation

College of Information System and Management, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China. Michael.qiu@139.com.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, MDPI: Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute)

DOI

10.3390/ijerph14101155

PMID

28961188

Abstract

The chemical industry is very important for the world economy and this industrial sector represents a substantial income source for developing countries. However, existing regulations on controlling atmospheric pollutants, and the enforcement of these regulations, often are insufficient in such countries. As a result, the deterioration of surrounding ecosystems and a quality decrease of the atmospheric environment can be observed. Previous works in this domain fail to generate executable and pragmatic solutions for inspection agencies due to practical challenges. In addressing these challenges, we introduce a so-called Chemical Plant Environment Protection Game (CPEP) to generate reasonable schedules of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations (i.e., daily management plans) for inspection agencies. First, so-called Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) in conjunction with source estimation methods are applied into this research. Second, high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations as well as gas sensor modules are modeled in the CPEP game. Third, simplified data analysis on the regularly discharging of chemical plants is utilized to construct the CPEP game. Finally, an illustrative case study is used to investigate the effectiveness of the CPEP game, and a realistic case study is conducted to illustrate how the models and algorithms being proposed in this paper, work in daily practice.

RESULTS show that playing a CPEP game can reduce operational costs of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations. Moreover, evidence suggests that playing the game leads to more compliance from the chemical plants towards the inspection agencies. Therefore, the CPEP game is able to assist the environmental protection authorities in daily management work and reduce the potential risks of gaseous pollutants dispersion incidents.


Language: en

Keywords

Chemical Plant Environmental Protection; Stackelberg Security Games; game theory; historical monitoring data; source estimation methods

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