Citation

Faris E. Am. J. Sociol. 1928; 34(2): 271-281.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1928, University of Chicago Press)

DOI

10.2307/2765601

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Psychology was defined as the science of behavior some years before the appearance of "behaviorism," and the effort of this school to limit the notion of behavior to the observable movements is unwarranted. The attempt to discard all consideration of the subjective experiences neglects the middle or mediating part of the act, which is equally important with the objective and observable. Actions occur in separate and organized temporal structures with a unity that is the result of the subjective imagination. The attitude is in part the residual effect of the act, but it remains as a predisposition to certain forms of subsequent activity. The motive or intention is an integral part of the act, and no estimate of the quality of the act can be made without considering the inner experience. Objects or values also occur as the result of action and are correlates of attitudes. "The attitude is the hunger; the object is the beefsteak." Objects result from organizations of experience, and therefore are empirical, not metaphysical. Desires are incomplete acts, impulses with images of the object of satisfaction. Opinions and answers to questions about attitudes introduce a fourth factor into the problem of attitudes and their determination, and much past effort has failed because the fourth factor was not suspected. Attitudes exist as tendencies to act; they are subjective, and therefore difficult to investigate, but many invisible objects can be studied, and a great many competent men are now engaged in research with every promise of notable success.