@article{ref1,
title="Implicit memory for possible and impossible objects: constraints on the construction of structural descriptions",
journal="Journal of experimental psychology: learning, memory, and cognition",
year="1991",
author="Schacter, D. L. and Cooper, L. A. and Delaney, S. M. and Peterson, M. A. and Tharan, M.",
volume="17",
number="1",
pages="3-19",
abstract="Four experiments examined implicit memory or priming effects on an object decision task in which subjects decided whether structurally possible or impossible novel objects could exist in three-dimensional form. Results revealed equivalent levels of priming for possible objects after 1 vs. 4 5-s exposures to the same structural encoding task (Experiment 1) and when objects were studied with a single structural encoding task or 2 different structural encoding tasks (Experiment 3). Explicit memory, by contrast, was greatly affected by both manipulations. However, priming of possible objects was not observed when Ss were given only a single 1-s exposure to perform a structural encoding task (Experiment 2). No evidence for priming of impossible objects was observed in any of the 4 experiments. The data suggest that object decision priming depends on a presemantic structural description system that is distinct from episodic memory.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0278-7393",
doi="",
url="http://dx.doi.org/"
}