@article{ref1,
title="Enforcement swamping: A positive-feedback mechanism in rates of illicit activity",
journal="Mathematical and computer modelling",
year="1993",
author="Kleiman, Mark A.R.",
volume="17",
number="2",
pages="65-75",
abstract="If enforcement resources are constrained, the expected value of the penalty facing potential violators falls as the frequency of violation rises. Thus trends in rule-breaking will tend to be self-reinforcing, as illustrated by a Schelling-type tipping model. The search for “root causes” of high violation rates may therefore be in vain. Enforcement policies, especially against illicit markets, should be designed with this phenomenon in mind.<p />",
language="",
issn="0895-7177",
doi="10.1016/0895-7177(93)90240-Y",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(93)90240-Y"
}