@article{ref1,
title="Noncompliance and the limits of coercion: The problematic enforcement of unpopular laws",
journal="Mathematical and computer modelling",
year="1989",
author="Huckfeldt, Robert",
volume="12",
number="4-5",
pages="533-545",
abstract="This paper constructs a mathematical representation of the dynamic logic tying together coercion and noncompliance within political systems. Several concepts are central to the effort: system legitimacy; the long-term institutionalized investment of the political system in coercive resources; the vulnerability of political systems to mass noncompliance; and the short-term response of the political system to noncompliance. The analysis addresses a number of issues. What are the dynamic consequences of system legitimacy and of the political system's institutionalized investment in coercive resources? What are the consequences of its short-term coercive response to noncompliance? Under what circumstances will noncompliance be eliminated? Under what circumstances will it be controlled? Under what circumstances will political systems become overwhelmed by noncompliance? A central argument of this paper is that aggressive short-term responses to noncompliance are likely to be ineffective in controlling noncompliance, and they are likely to aggravate the vulnerability of political systems to mass noncompliance.<p />",
language="",
issn="0895-7177",
doi="10.1016/0895-7177(89)90423-8",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90423-8"
}