@article{ref1,
title="A rent-seeking model of international competition and alliances",
journal="Defence economics",
year="1993",
author="Linster, Bruce G.",
volume="4",
number="3",
pages="213-226",
abstract="This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent-seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two-country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three-country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent-seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies' interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash-Cournot equilibrium is computed.<p />",
language="",
issn="1043-0717",
doi="10.1080/10430719308404761",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10430719308404761"
}