@article{ref1,
title="Bargaining versus fighting",
journal="Defence and peace economics",
year="2006",
author="Skaperdas, Stergios",
volume="17",
number="6",
pages="657-676",
abstract="I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g. arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for settlement, I demonstrate how different division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic effects. I then analyze some sources of conflict. I emphasize long-term, strategic considerations by examining an illustrative model and discussing particular historical examples.<p />",
language="",
issn="1024-2694",
doi="10.1080/10242690601025617",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690601025617"
}