@article{ref1,
title="Better weapons or better troops?",
journal="Defence and peace economics",
year="2001",
author="Lipow, Jonathan and Feinerman, Eli",
volume="12",
number="4",
pages="271-284",
abstract="Many observers of Israel's defense resource allocation process believe that insufficient resources are devoted to troop quality, while excessive resources are devoted to weapon quality. In this paper, we offer a potential explanation for this phenomenon. In our example, officers seek to signal their ability through their budgeting choices. Signaling behavior, combined with the timing and informational structure of defense decision-making, results in a sub-optimal allocation of resources to training and troop quality.<p />",
language="",
issn="1024-2694",
doi="10.1080/10430710108404988",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10430710108404988"
}