@article{ref1,
title="Public safety and the moral dilemma in the defense against terror",
journal="Defence and peace economics",
year="2005",
author="Franck, R and Hillman, Arye L. and Krausz, Michael",
volume="16",
number="5",
pages="347-364",
abstract="The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre-emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre-emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre-emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.<p />",
language="",
issn="1024-2694",
doi="10.1080/10242690500207399",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690500207399"
}