@article{ref1,
title="No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis",
journal="American law and economics review",
year="2002",
author="Liao, Y.-p. and White, M. J.",
volume="4",
number="2",
pages="258-294",
abstract="This article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often.<p />",
language="",
issn="1465-7252",
doi="10.1093/aler/4.2.258",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/4.2.258"
}