@article{ref1,
title="Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?",
journal="American journal of political science",
year="2009",
author="Wittman, Donald",
volume="53",
number="3",
pages="588-602",
abstract="<p> <i>This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.</i> </p><p />",
language="",
issn="0092-5853",
doi="10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00388.x",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00388.x"
}