@article{ref1,
title="A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox",
journal="Philosophy and phenomenological research",
year="2007",
author="Douven, Igor",
volume="74",
number="2",
pages="326-345",
abstract="There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.<p />",
language="",
issn="0031-8205",
doi="10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00020.x",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00020.x"
}