@article{ref1,
title="Bizarre Beliefs and Rational Choices: A Behavioral Approach to Analytic Narratives",
journal="Journal of politics",
year="2007",
author="Schiemann, John W.",
volume="69",
number="2",
pages="511-524",
abstract="Rational choice analytic narratives claim to take seriously the way real actors form their beliefs. I argue that a commonly applied formal technique—perfect Bayesian equilibrium—inadequately accounts for realistic beliefs, unnecessarily impoverishing analytic narratives. I propose an equilibrium concept drawn from cognitive psychology—support theory equilibrium—that provides an accurate account of beliefs within a formal analytic narrative approach. I ground both the critique and the alternative in a discussion of ethnic mobilization in Yugoslavia. The result is a behaviorally informed analytic narrative that offers a more accurate account of the role of real—including bizarre—beliefs in strategic interaction.<p />",
language="",
issn="0022-3816",
doi="10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00547.x",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00547.x"
}