@article{ref1,
title="Plural situational logic: the rationa(lisabi)lity principle",
journal="Cambridge journal of economics",
year="2009",
author="Kerstenetzky, Celia Lessa",
volume="33",
number="2",
pages="193-209",
abstract="In the context of a critique of the exclusive use of the rational choice approach in economics, the article presents a pluralistic interpretation of the Popperian notion of situational logic as an alternative approach. This is proposed in connection with a reading of the rationality principle as a rationalisability principle. I argue that this principle can accommodate an ample array of rational responses to different situations and even rationalise the multiple responses that are given to the same situation. I present some examples to illustrate the relevance of the proposed interpretation.<p />",
language="",
issn="0309-166X",
doi="10.1093/cje/ben049",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/ben049"
}