@article{ref1,
title="Dual Processes and Moral Rules",
journal="Emotion review",
year="2011",
author="Mallon, Ron and Nichols, Shaun",
volume="3",
number="3",
pages="284-285",
abstract="Recent work proclaims a dominant role for automatic, intuitive, and emotional processes in producing ordinary moral judgment, despite the fact that we have little direct evidence about moral judgment &quot;in the wild.&quot; Indirect support comes via an assumption of dual-process theory: that conscious, reasoning processes are resource intensive. We argue that reasoning that employs consciously available moral rules undermines this assumption, but this has not been appreciated because of a failure to distinguish between explanation and justification. We conclude that it remains unclear what sorts of cognitive processes are dominant in ordinary moral judgments.<p />",
language="",
issn="1754-0739",
doi="10.1177/1754073911402376",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073911402376"
}