@article{ref1,
title="Terrorism and Cabinet Duration",
journal="International economic review",
year="2011",
author="Gassebner, Martin and Jong‐A‐Pin, Richard and Mierau, Jochen O.",
volume="52",
number="4",
pages="1253-1270",
abstract="Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970-2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.<p />",
language="",
issn="0020-6598",
doi="10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x"
}