@article{ref1,
title="On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict",
journal="NBER working papers series",
year="2006",
author="Caselli, Francesco and Ii, Wilbur John Coleman",
volume="2006",
number="online",
pages="w12125-w12125",
abstract="We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy%u2019s resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.<p />",
language="",
issn="0898-2937",
doi="",
url="http://dx.doi.org/"
}