@article{ref1,
title="Product liability, entry incentives and market structure",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2000",
author="Hamilton, Stephen F. and Sunding, David L.",
volume="20",
number="2",
pages="269-283",
abstract="The article characterizes the entry incentives provided by increases in product liability under various forms of competition. It is demonstrated that the entry of small, high-cost firms is likely to occur in imperfectly competitive markets when the average damage increases with industry output. Special cases are considered, including Cournot-Nash oligopoly and dominant firm-competitive fringe.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00029-6",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00029-6"
}