@article{ref1,
title="Precautionary incentives for privately informed victims",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2003",
author="Clements, Matthew T.",
volume="23",
number="3",
pages="237-251",
abstract="When one victim's precautions against crime have spillover benefits to other victims, individuals do not take the socially optimal amount of precaution. I explore the use of criminal sanctions as a mechanism to correct this: criminals are punished based on the level of precaution taken by the victim. The problem is compounded when victims have private information about their costs of precaution. I find that, when a sanctioning scheme is used to induce different levels of precaution from high- and low-cost victims, a sanction less than the maximum may be used to punish crimes against either type of victim. I also consider the extent to which such a mechanism is consistent with current legal doctrine.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/j.irle.2003.09.006",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2003.09.006"
}