@article{ref1,
title="Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2009",
author="Garoupa, Nuno",
volume="29",
number="1",
pages="25-28",
abstract="Mandatory prosecution is inefficient according to legal economists. We argue that when prosecutors are fairly insulated from their performance or are highly risk-averse mandatory prosecution is better than selective prosecution. This result has important implications for comparative law. We use our findings to provide a positive explanation for the stylized fact that mandatory prosecution generally prevails in civil law jurisdictions whereas selective prosecution is typical of common law jurisdictions.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/j.irle.2008.07.001",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2008.07.001"
}