@article{ref1,
title="Risk reduction or risk compensation? The case of mandatory safety-belt use laws",
journal="Journal of risk and uncertainty",
year="1991",
author="Evans, William N. and Graham, John D.",
volume="4",
number="1",
pages="61-73",
abstract="The technological approach to risk regulation seeks to lessen the incidence of mortality and morbidity by modifying environmental conditions. Insofar as risk-taking behavior is purposive, social scientists have predicted that technological progress may be negated by various forms of &quot;risk compensation.&quot; The validity of this hypothesis is tested in the transportation sector with data from the U.S. on the effects of new mandatory safety-belt-use laws. A fixed-effects model of traffic fatality counts is estimated using pooled data from 50 states during the 1975-1987 period. Results suggest that such laws have reduced mortality among car occupants to a degree that is compatible with the predictions of technologists. However, there is weak evidence of increased mortality among some nonoccupants, a pattern predicted by risk-compensation theorists. The lifesaving effects of belt-use laws are largest in states that permit primary police enforcement and appear to be somewhat larger for front-seat occupants age 21 and under. Although offsetting behavior appears to be small relative to lifesaving effects, it may take several more years for any compensatory behavior to achieve a new equilibrium.<p />",
language="",
issn="0895-5646",
doi="10.1007/BF00057886",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00057886"
}