@article{ref1,
title="Asymmetrical scepticism towards criminal evidence: The role of goal- and belief-consistency",
journal="Applied cognitive psychology",
year="2011",
author="Marksteiner, Tamara and Ask, Karl and Reinhard, Marc-André and Granhag, Pär Anders",
volume="25",
number="4",
pages="541-547",
abstract="Previous demonstrations of asymmetrical scepticism (i.e., that investigators perceive evidence inconsistent [vs. consistent] with the focal hypothesis of a case as less reliable) have failed to account for the underlying mechanism. This study examined whether inconsistent evidence is discredited due to its inconsistency with a prior belief or because it conflicts with the goal to reach closure in a case. Police trainees (N = 107) were presented with a homicide case and judged the reliability of incriminating or exonerating evidence while entertaining a 'guilty' or 'innocent' hypothesis concerning a suspect. Asymmetrical scepticism was observed in the guilty condition, but not in the innocent condition, partially supporting the goal-consistency explanation. Implications for the organization of criminal investigations are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.<p /><p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0888-4080",
doi="10.1002/acp.1719",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.1719"
}