@article{ref1,
title="Effect of consensus on punitive behavior",
journal="Shinrigaku Kenkyu",
year="2013",
author="Hatano, Ayaka and Horita, Yutaka and Yamagishi, Toshio",
volume="83",
number="6",
pages="582-588",
abstract="In addition to the cost of punishment, the fear that others would evaluate punishers negatively can be a major obstacle for resolving the second-order social dilemma or failure of providing sanctions useful for solving a social dilemma problem. In an experiment with 81 participants, we tested whether providing information that other participants were in favor of punishing non-cooperators in a social dilemma situation would enhance cooperation in the second-order dilemma (i.e., punishment of non-cooperators). Participants received feedback of three bogus &quot;participants&quot; choices in a four-person social dilemma, in which one bogus participant defected and two others cooperated, and then received a chance to punish the sole non-cooperator. The hypothesis was supported among those who were motivated to punish the non-cooperator. They punished the non-cooperator when they were informed that the other participants also wanted to punish the non-cooperator. The feedback information that the other participants wanted to punish the non-cooperator induced the participants who were not motivated to punish the non-cooperator to punish less.<p /> <p>Language: ja</p>",
language="ja",
issn="0021-5236",
doi="",
url="http://dx.doi.org/"
}