@article{ref1,
title="Ordered rape: a principal-agent analysis of wartime sexual violence in the DR Congo",
journal="Violence against women",
year="2015",
author="Schneider, Gerald and Banholzer, Lilli and Albarracin, Laura",
volume="21",
number="11",
pages="1341-1363",
abstract="Policy makers and academics often contend that organizational anarchy permits soldiers to perpetrate sexual violence. A recent United Nations report supports this thesis especially with regard to the massive sexual abuse in the Congolese civil war. We challenge the anarchy argument and maintain, based on a principal-agent framework, that opportunistic military commanders can order their soldiers to rape through the use of sanctions and rewards. Our qualitative and quantitative analysis of a survey of 96 Congolese ex-soldiers shows that ordered rape is more likely in organizations where soldiers fear punishment and in which commanders distribute drugs as stimulants.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="1077-8012",
doi="10.1177/1077801215593645",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801215593645"
}