@article{ref1,
title="From moral concern to moral constraint",
journal="Current opinion in behavioral sciences",
year="2015",
author="Cushman, Fiery",
volume="3",
number="",
pages="58-62",
abstract="Current research into the neural basis of moral decision-making endorses a common theme: The mechanisms we use to make value-guided decisions concerning each other are remarkably similar to those we use to make value-guided decisions for ourselves. In other words, moral decisions are just another kind of ordinary decision. Yet, there is something unsettling about this conclusion: We often feel as if morality places an absolute constraint on our behavior, in a way unlike ordinary personal concerns. What is the neural and psychological basis of this feeling of moral constraint? Several models are considered and outstanding questions highlighted.<p />",
language="en",
issn="2352-1546",
doi="10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.01.006",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.01.006"
}