@article{ref1,
title="Catching or fining speeders",
journal="Journal of transport economics and policy",
year="2015",
author="Delhaye, Eef and Proost, Stef and Rousseau, Sandra",
volume="49",
number="3",
pages="415-437",
abstract="This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice between fine and detection probability. We distinguish two lobby groups: vulnerable road users and car drivers. If only vulnerable road users are lobbying, we find that the expected fine is higher than if only the interests of car drivers are taken into account. When we consider the choice between detection probability and the fine for a given expected fine, we find that the fine preferred by the vulnerable road users is higher than socially optimal. This theory is empirically tested for the enforcement of speeding in the European Union.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0022-5258",
doi="",
url="http://dx.doi.org/"
}