@article{ref1,
title="Strange bedfellows? Common ground on the moral status question",
journal="Journal of medicine and philosophy",
year="2016",
author="Wilkins, Shane Maxwell",
volume="41",
number="2",
pages="130-147",
abstract="When does a developing human being acquire moral status? I outline three different positions based on substance ontology that attempt to solve the question by locating some morally salient event in the process of human development question. In the second section, I consider some specific empirical objections to one of these positions, refute them, and then show how similar objections and responses would generalize to the other substance-based positions on the question. The crucial finding is that all the attempts to answer the question that involve substance ontology need to appeal to dispositions.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0360-5310",
doi="10.1093/jmp/jhv066",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhv066"
}