@article{ref1,
title="A model of dynamic conflict in ethnocracies",
journal="Defence and peace economics",
year="2018",
author="Bakshi, Dripto and Dasgupta, Indraneel",
volume="29",
number="2",
pages="147-170",
abstract="We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The contest yields the per-period relative influence over institutions, which partly spills over into the next period, by affecting relative conflict efficiency. Our model generates non-monotone evolution of both conflict and distribution. <br><br>RESULTS suggest that external interventions, when effective in reducing current conflict and protecting weaker groups, may end up sowing the seeds of greater future conflict.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="1024-2694",
doi="10.1080/10242694.2015.1092204",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2015.1092204"
}