@article{ref1,
title="Rule-based reasoning is fast and belief-based reasoning can be slow: challenging current explanations of belief-bias and base-rate neglect",
journal="Journal of experimental psychology: learning, memory, and cognition",
year="2017",
author="Newman, Ian R. and Gibb, Maia and Thompson, Valerie A.",
volume="43",
number="7",
pages="1154-1170",
abstract="It is commonly assumed that belief-based reasoning is fast and automatic, whereas rule-based reasoning is slower and more effortful. Dual-Process theories of reasoning rely on this speed-asymmetry explanation to account for a number of reasoning phenomena, such as base-rate neglect and belief-bias. The goal of the current study was to test this hypothesis about the relative speed of belief-based and rule-based processes. Participants solved base-rate problems (Experiment 1) and conditional inferences (Experiment 2) under a challenging deadline; they then gave a second response in free time. We found that fast responses were informed by rules of probability and logical validity, and that slow responses incorporated belief-based information. Implications for Dual-Process theories and future research options for dissociating Type I and Type II processes are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record<br><br>(c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0278-7393",
doi="10.1037/xlm0000372",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000372"
}