@article{ref1,
title="African communal basis for autonomy and life choices",
journal="Developing world bioethics",
year="2018",
author="Ikuenobe, Polycarp",
volume="18",
number="3",
pages="212-221",
abstract="I argue that the metaphysical capacity of autonomy is not intrinsically valuable; it is valuable only when used in relation to a community's values and instrumentally for making the proper choices that will promote one's own and the community's well-being. I use the example of the choice to take one's life by suicide to illuminate this view. I articulate a plausible African conception of personhood as a basis for the idea of relational autonomy. I argue that this conception is better understood as a social-moral thesis, and not a metaphysical thesis. A metaphysical thesis gives an account of the abstract nature of an atomic individual, his agency, and rational choice. The social-moral thesis indicates that personhood and autonomy are positive and relational to the life plans, well-being, material conditions, and the best means for achieving them that are made available and possible by harmonious living in a community. This idea of autonomy is not just having the capacity of freewill; it also involves how such freewill is used, in terms of how an individual's choices are guided by internalized communal values.<br><br>© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="1471-8731",
doi="10.1111/dewb.12161",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12161"
}