@article{ref1,
title="The design and price of information",
journal="American economic review",
year="2018",
author="Bergemann, Dirk and Bonatti, Alessandro and Smolin, Alex",
volume="108",
number="1",
pages="1-48",
abstract="A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of statistical experiments. We establish the properties that any revenue-maximizing menu of experiments must satisfy. Every experiment is a non-dispersed stochastic matrix, and every menu contains a fully informative experiment. In the cases of binary states and actions, or binary types, we provide an explicit construction of the optimal menu of experiments.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0002-8282",
doi="10.1257/aer.20161079",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161079"
}