@article{ref1,
title="The role of visibility on third party punishment actions for the enforcement of social norms",
journal="Economics letters",
year="2018",
author="Kamei, Kenju",
volume="171",
number="",
pages="193-197",
abstract="This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0165-1765",
doi="10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043"
}