
@article{ref1,
title="Gun violence agnosticism",
journal="Essays in philosophy",
year="2015",
author="Bernstein, C'Zar",
volume="16",
number="2",
pages="232-246",
abstract="Beliefs about guns are almost invariably formed in response to highly publicised mass shootings and stories about violent gun crimes, and not on the basis of an impartial examination of the relevant criminological evidence. The emotional responses of people to these kinds of events have a significant impact on public policy, usually in the direction of gun control and outright gun bans. Outright bans and strict controls immediately followed the Dunblane and Port Arthur massacres in the United Kingdom and Australia, respectively. The situation in the United States is much more complex (because gun ownership rights are constitutionally protected), but calls for strict gun controls by high-level politicians (which were ultimately unsuccessful) immediately followed the infamous Aurora and Newtown massacres. In this paper, I shall argue that these kinds of immediate (largely emotional) responses are irrational in the light of the evidence. The evidence that the prevalence of gun ownership significantly increases violent crime is very weak. Indeed, the best evidence suggests either that there is a negative effect on crime or no discernible effect whatever. I shall argue that the evidence supports, at the very best for the anti-gun side, agnosticism about the negative criminogenic effects of gun ownership. Given the plausible proposition that there is at least a prima facie moral right (a right that can be outweighed given sufficiently weighty considerations) to keep and bear arms, I argue that agnosticism supports the proposition that there ought to be a legal right to keep and bear arms.    The central thesis of this paper is as follows: (GVA) Nobody who has impartially examined the extant criminological evidence knows that the criminogenic harms of gun ownership and carrying outweigh the benefits.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="1526-0569",
doi="10.7710/1526-0569.1534",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1534"
}