@article{ref1,
title="Aggregation, risk, and reductio",
journal="Ethics",
year="2020",
author="Horton, Joe",
volume="130",
number="4",
pages="514-529",
abstract="Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer &quot;yes&quot; and &quot;no,&quot; respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can be no adequate partially aggregative view. I then argue that the only plausible response to this reductio is to accept a fully aggregative view.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0014-1704",
doi="10.1086/708534",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/708534"
}