@article{ref1,
title="The epistemic benefits of worldview disagreement",
journal="Social epistemology",
year="2021",
author="Lougheed, Kirk",
volume="35",
number="1",
pages="85-98",
abstract="In my recent book, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement, I develop a defense of non-conciliationism, but one that only applies in research contexts: Epistemic benefits are more likely in the offing if inquirers &quot;stick to their guns&quot; in the face of disagreement. I aim to expand my original account by examining its implications for non-inquiry beliefs. I'm particularly interested in broader worldview disagreements. I want to examine how inquirers should react upon discovering that they disagree about the truth value of a particular proposition because they disagree about a whole host of related propositions. I argue that in many ways, worldview disagreements are easier to work with than disagreement over isolated propositions, in part because it is easier to provide a set of criteria by which to evaluate worldviews. I conclude that my original argument can, at least in part, be successfully expanded to include worldview disagreement.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0269-1728",
doi="10.1080/02691728.2020.1794079",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2020.1794079"
}