@article{ref1,
title="Incorporating conflict risks in pedestrian-motorist interactions: a game theoretical approach",
journal="Accident analysis and prevention",
year="2021",
author="Zhang, Yunchang and Fricker, Jon D.",
volume="159",
number="",
pages="e106254-e106254",
abstract="At &quot;semi-controlled&quot; crosswalks with yield signs and markings, negotiations as to the right-of-way occur frequently between pedestrians and motorists, to determine who should proceed first. This kind of &quot;negotiation&quot; often leads to traffic delay and potential conflicts. To minimize misunderstandings between pedestrian and motorist that can have serious safety consequences, it is essential that we understand the decision-making process as the &quot;players&quot; interact in real street-crossing situations. This paper employs a game-theoretic approach to investigate the joint behaviors of pedestrians and motorists from the perspective of safety. Assuming bounded rationality for each player, the quantal response equilibrium is a special kind of game with incomplete information. Explanatory variables such as conflicting risks and time savings can be incorporated into the payoff functions of the &quot;players&quot; via expected utility functions. Finally, model parameters can be estimated using an expectation maximization algorithm. The game-theoretic framework is applied to model pedestrian-motorist interactions at a semi-controlled crosswalk on a university campus. The estimation results indicate that the likelihood of pedestrian-vehicle conflict can be quantified. The results can lead to control measures that facilitate the negotiation between pedestrian and motorist and reduce the conflict risk at semi-controlled crosswalks.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0001-4575",
doi="10.1016/j.aap.2021.106254",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2021.106254"
}