@article{ref1,
title="Sensitivity, safety, and admissibility",
journal="Synthese",
year="2022",
author="Johnson King, Zoë A.",
volume="200",
number="6",
pages="e511-e511",
abstract="This paper concerns recent attempts to use the epistemological notions of sensitivity and safety to shed light on legal debates about so-called &quot;bare&quot; statistical evidence. These notions might be thought to explain either the outright inadmissibility of such evidence or its inadequacy for a finding of fact--two different phenomena that are often discussed in tandem, but that, I insist, we do better to keep separate. I argue that neither sensitivity nor safety can hope to explain statistical evidence's inadmissibility, since neither offers a plausible criterion of admissibility that would exclude such evidence; both are subject to copious counterexamples, especially given their factivity, and it is difficult even to state a coherent criterion of admissibility in terms of either sensitivity or safety. The possibility remains, though, that either notion might explain statistical evidence's inadequacy for a finding of fact; I express some doubts about this possibility but do not rule it out.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0039-7857",
doi="10.1007/s11229-022-03972-9",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03972-9"
}