@article{ref1,
title="The stressor criterion and diagnosing posttraumatic stress disorder in a legal context",
journal="Australian psychologist",
year="1996",
author="Dobson, Matthew and Marshall, Richard P.",
volume="31",
number="3",
pages="219-223",
abstract="Bryant (1996) outlined a recent Federal Court case where an applicant claimed to be suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following exposure to atomic testing in Maralinga. In his paper, Bryant (1996) discusses the legal definition of a stressor, highlighting the ambiguity which remains in the DSM-IV definition of the stressor criterion (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In this comment, our aim is not to question Bryant's argument concerning the ambiguity of the stressor criterion, but to question the view that there might be some way of objectifying the definition of a stressor in the diagnosis of PTSD, thereby standardising the diagnosis. Our perspective on the PTSD diagnosis is necessarily biased by our experience as clinicians and researchers in the field of war-related trauma. Although PTSD has been conceptualised as an anxiety reaction that follows in the wake of exposure to an extreme event, there may not be a discrete class of stressors that cause PTSD. In supporting this view, we argue that the etiology of PTSD is multidimensional. It follows that PTSD cannot be understood in terms of a cause-effect type relationship between the stressor and symptoms, as is required for the assessment of compensation/litigation claims in the courtroom setting.<p />",
language="en",
issn="0005-0067",
doi="10.1080/00050069608260210",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00050069608260210"
}