%0 Journal Article
%T Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?
%J American journal of political science
%D 2009
%A Wittman, Donald
%V 53
%N 3
%P 588-602
%X <p> <i>This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.</i> </p><p />
%G 
%I John Wiley and Sons
%@ 0092-5853
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00388.x