TY  - JOUR
PY  - 1993//
TI  - A rent-seeking model of international competition and alliances
JO  - Defence economics
A1  - Linster, Bruce G.
SP  - 213
EP  - 226
VL  - 4
IS  - 3
N2  - This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent-seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two-country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three-country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent-seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies' interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash-Cournot equilibrium is computed.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 1043-0717
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10430719308404761
ID  - ref1
ER  -