TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2004//
TI  - Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds
JO  - Defence and peace economics
A1  - Azam, J.-p.
A1  - Saadi-Sedik, Tahsin
SP  - 343
EP  - 364
VL  - 15
IS  - 4
N2  - We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator's participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 1024-2694
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1024269042000201935
ID  - ref1
ER  -