TY  - JOUR
PY  - 1999//
TI  - Protection against national emergency: International public goods and insurance
JO  - Defence and peace economics
A1  - Ihori, Toshihiro
SP  - 117
EP  - 137
VL  - 10
IS  - 2
N2  - This paper develops a model of economic protection against random emergency costs. To mitigate the effects of these disruptions, each country creates a private mutual insurance market and provides voluntarily an international public good. We will explore how protection through voluntary provision of an international public good as well as mutual insurance would affect welfare. The existence of both mutual insurance and an international public good is crucial to obtain welfare equalization and the weak paradox of international transfer.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 1024-2694
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10430719908404920
ID  - ref1
ER  -