TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2005//
TI  - Public safety and the moral dilemma in the defense against terror
JO  - Defence and peace economics
A1  - Franck, R
A1  - Hillman, Arye L.
A1  - Krausz, Michael
SP  - 347
EP  - 364
VL  - 16
IS  - 5
N2  - The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre-emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre-emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre-emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 1024-2694
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690500207399
ID  - ref1
ER  -