TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2002//
TI  - No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis
JO  - American law and economics review
A1  - Liao, Y.-p.
A1  - White, M. J.
SP  - 258
EP  - 294
VL  - 4
IS  - 2
N2  - This article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 1465-7252
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/4.2.258
ID  - ref1
ER  -