TY  - JOUR
PY  - 1991//
TI  - Reputation building in hostage taking incidents
JO  - Defence economics
A1  - Scott, J. L.
SP  - 209
EP  - 218
VL  - 2
IS  - 3
N2  - We test whether governments attempt to build reputations as not negotiating with terrorists. The test is indirect, relying on the greater incentive of governments to build reputations than exists for non-governments. We also test whether terrorists make errors in their appraisal of the state of the world in hostage taking incidents. We employ Tobit and Heckman's selection model in testing, and find strong evidence that governments do attempt to build reputations. We also find that terrorists do not make statistically large errors in their appraisal of the state of the world, lending support to the use of equilibrium models in the study of terrorism.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 1043-0717
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10430719108404693
ID  - ref1
ER  -